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1. Introduction 
For more than a decade Japan has experienced a phase of unprecedentedly slow growth. The 
causes of this stagnation are the subject of considerable controversy. One group of scholars attributes 
the disappointing performance to a lack of effective demand and a liquidity trap caused by deflation.
1 
The other group points out that there are several important supply-side factors, which reduced Japan’s 
economic growth. For example, Japan’s aging population and a gradual reduction in the statutory 
work-week have contributed to a slowdown in the growth of labor input.
2 Japan also experienced a 
decline in total factor productivity (TFP), which has important effects on economic growth not only 
because it reduces output growth by itself but also because it diminishes the rate of return to capital 
and discourages private investment. 
Although there are as many different estimates for Japan’s recent TFP growth as there are 
studies on this issue, most economists seem to agree that Japan’s TFP growth substantially declined in 
the 1990s. Probably the most popular explanation of Japan’s TFP growth slowdown is the “zombie” 
hypothesis. This states that in order to conceal their bad loans, Japanese banks have been keeping alive 
money-losing large borrowers by “evergreening” loans and discounting lending rates, although the 
chance that these borrowers will recover is slim (Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap 2004). Because of the 
existence of zombie firms, the entry and growth of more productive firms are impeded and TFP 
growth slows down in industries infested by zombies (Ahearne and Shinada 2004). Japanese banks’ 
bad loans are concentrated in non-manufacturing sectors, such as real estate, construction, commerce, 
and services, since a major cause of the bad loans is the burst of the land price bubble in the early 
1990s. For example, according to Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2004) the share of total assets held 
by zombie firms in the total assets held by publicly traded firms was around 10 percent in the 
                                                        
1  For example, see Yoshikawa (2003) and M. Fukao (2003). 
2  On these supply side factors, see Hayashi and Prescott (2002).   2
manufacturing sector in the 1998-2002 period whereas it was around 30 percent in real estate and 
services, and 20 percent in construction and retail and wholesale (excluding the nine largest general 
trading companies).
3 Therefore, according to the zombie hypothesis, we would expect that the 
slowdown of Japan’s TFP has been concentrated mainly in the non-manufacturing sector.  
Contrary to this conjecture, the majority of recent studies on sectoral TFP growth have found 
that the slowdown in TFP growth was more serious in the manufacturing than in the 
non-manufacturing sector (Yoshikawa and Matsumoto 2001, Nishimura and Minetaki 2003, 
Miyagawa 2003, and Fukao et al. 2004). Given that the slowdown in TFP growth has been more 
severe in the manufacturing sector, there is a need for more detailed analysis of this trend and its 
causes. The present paper aims to examine the issue using firm-level data of the Ministry of Economy, 
International Trade and Industry’s Kigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa (Basic Survey on Business Activities 
by Enterprises), which cover most of Japan’s manufacturing activities for the period of 1994-2001.  
In our analysis, we concentrate on two issues in particular. First, we decompose TFP growth in 
the manufacturing sector into a within-firm effect, a reallocation effect, and an entry-exit effect. If 
firms compete with each other and entry barriers are low, high-productivity firms will enter the market 
and expand their production. This “metabolism” will enhance the TFP growth of the industry. Using 
the same micro-data of the Kigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa, for the 1994-1998 period, Nishimura, et al. 
(2003) and Fukao and Kwon (2003) studied the productivity of firms and conducted productivity 
decompositions. In spite of the difference of the methodology adopted,
4 both studies found that the 
                                                        
3 We should note that their dataset, which is taken from the Development Bank of Japan Database 
covers a very limited percentage of economic activity in Japan. In the case of the non-manufacturing 
sectors, the coverage measured by the percentage of workers is less than 10%. We will discuss this 
issue in more detail in section 4. 
4 Nishihmura et al. adopted the methodology used by Griliches and Regev (1995) and Aw, Chen, 
and Roberts (2001). However, this methodology makes it difficult to separate the entry and exit 
effects and to identify the covariance effect (the definition of these effects is presented in section 3).   3
average TFP level of exiting firms was higher than that of staying firms in some industries. This 
“negative metabolism” may have slowed down TFP growth in the manufacturing sector. In this paper, 
using the updated data, we decompose TFP growth for the longer period of 1994-2001. By adopting 
the methodology used by Baily et al. (1992) and Forster et al. (1998), which has been commonly used 
in recent studies, we can compare our results with preceding studies on the US, a number of European 
countries, and Korea. 
Second, we measure the gap in the TFP level between a group of high–TFP firms and a group of 
low–TFP firms and compare the characteristics of these two groups. We show that the TFP gap 
between the two groups is widening in many industries, including drugs and medicine, electronic data 
processing machines and electronic equipment, and motor vehicles, where R&D intensity is high and 
the internationalization of firms is more advanced (we measure internationalization by outward direct 
investment, the introduction of foreign capital, and procurements from abroad). We found that the 
high–TFP firms tend to have a higher R&D intensity, a higher degree of internationalization, larger 
scale, and a lower liability-asset ratio.  
We also found that greater R&D intensity and internationalization have positive effects on 
firms’ TFP growth. Similar to the “IT (information technology) divide” among workers, a new divide 
caused by R&D and internationalization seems to be emerging and growing in Japan’s manufacturing 
industry.
5  We also show that the reduction of the number of workers by the low–TFP firms is not much 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Fukao and Kwon adopted the methodology used by Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992) and Forster, 
Haltiwanger and Krizan (1998), which allows us to separate the entry and exit effects and identify 
the covariance effect. Another difference is that Nishimura et al. used value added as a measure of 
output whereas Fukao and Kwon used gross output as a measure of output. 
5 In several years, the METI Survey included questions on firms’ introduction of information 
technology, such as the introduction of CAD (computer-aided design) and CAM (computer-aided 
manufacturing) systems and the use of LANs (local area networks) within a firm group. But the 
questions changed over time and the response ratio was not high. If we used these data in our   4
larger than the reduction by the high–TFP firms. The sales growth of the high–TFP firms is smaller 
than that of the low-TFP firms. Most high-TFP firms are also reducing their employment, probably 
because of organizational restructuring and the relocation of production abroad. This finding suggests 
that the “metabolism” is not working well in Japan’s manufacturing sector. 
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we present an overview of studies on 
Japan’s TFP growth in the 1990s at the macro- and the industry-level. In section 3 we conduct a 
decomposition of TFP growth in the manufacturing sector and compare our results with preceding 
studies on other developed economies. In section 4, we examine the movement in the TFP level gap 
between the 75 percentile firm and the 25 percentile firm by industry and by year and show that the 
gap has widened in major industries. We also compare the characteristics, TFP growth, and growth 
rate of employment of the top firm-group and the bottom firm-group. In section 5, we summarize our 
results and discuss the policy implications of our findings. 
 
2. Did TFP Growth Really Slow Down in the 1990s? 
In this section we present a brief overview of the empirical research on Japan’s TFP growth rate 
at the macro- and sectoral-levels in the 1990s. Table 2.1 summarizes the major results of preceding 
studies and compares the methodologies adopted. We placed studies with more pessimistic results (a 
large decline in TFP growth during the 1990s when compared with the 1980s) at the top of the table 
and placed those with more optimistic results at the bottom of the table.  
 
Insert Table 2.1 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
regression analysis, our sample size would be drastically reduced. For this reason, we do not analyze 
the effect of information technology on TFP growth in this paper.     5
The table shows that there are substantial differences among the studies in the estimated decline 
in TFP growth from the 1980s to the 1990s. Hayashi and Prescott (2002) and Yoshikawa and 
Matsumoto (2001) obtained the most pessimistic results, suggesting that the TFP growth rate at the 
macro-level declined by more than 2 percentage points from the 1980s to 1990s. According to the 
neoclassical growth model, the decline in TFP growth will also reduce the equilibrium growth rate of 
the real capital stock in balanced growth. If we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function with a 
capital share of one-third, a 2 percentage-point decline in TFP growth will cause a 3 percentage-point 
(=2+2/3) decline in the balanced growth rate. In contrast with these pessimistic results, several studies, 
such as Jorgenson and Motohashi (2003) and Kawamoto (2004), found that the TFP growth in the 
1990s was not substantially smaller than in the 1980s. 
If we carefully compare the methodologies adopted and the datasets used, we can see what 
causes the great variation in results and try to obtain a more accurate measure of TFP trends.
6 For 
example, Hayashi and Prescott (2002) do not take account of changes in the quality of labor. As the 
improvement in the quality of labor in Japan has slowed in recent years, their study overestimates the 
decline in TFP growth by neglecting such changes. Moreover, they do not take account of changes in 
capacity utilization. This factor also contributed to their overestimation of the decline in TFP growth.
7 
                                                        
6  Such a comparison is provided by Inui and Kwon (2004), who used the original datasets for factor 
inputs, gross outputs, and income and cost shares used in the studies by Hayashi and Prescott (2002), 
Jorgenson and Motohashi (2003), Cabinet Office (2002), and Fukao et al. (2003) and examined what 
differences in the datasets and methodologies were responsible for the large discrepancies among the 
results for TFP growth. 
7  When the capital stock is not fully utilized, the marginal productivity of capital might be different 
from the cost of capital. As Morrison (1993) has shown, we can tackle this issue more rigorously by 
estimating the variable cost function. Using micro data of Japanese manufacturing firms, Fukao and 
Kwon (2004) estimated variable cost functions and made adjustments for capacity utilization and 
scale economies. They found that the rate of technological progress, which is defined as a downward 
shift of the variable cost function, declined from 1994 to 2001 in many manufacturing sectors.   6
Finally, in their growth accounting they use real GNP instead of GDP as an output measure and include 
Japan’s net external assets in the capital stock. In GNP statistics, the rate of return to domestic capital 
is in gross terms and includes capital depreciation. On the other hand, the rate of return to Japan’s 
external assets is recorded in net terms. Therefore, the appropriate capital cost of net external assets for 
growth accounting is usually smaller than the cost of capital located in Japan. Hayashi and Prescott 
(2002) did not take account of this difference and assumed that the cost share of capital was constant 
over time. Since Japan accumulated a huge amount of net external assets in the 1990s,
8 Hayashi and 
Prescott seem to have overestimated the cost share of capital in the 1990s, the contribution of capital 
deepening in the 1990s, and, as a result, the decline in Japan’s TFP growth from the 1980s to the 
1990s. 
A more optimistic result was obtained by Jorgenson and Motohashi (2003). They found that 
Japan’s TFP growth rate declined from 0.96% in 1975-90 to 0.61% in 1990-95 but then accelerated 
again to 1.04% in 1995-2000. This optimistic result is partly based on their assumption on the deflator 
for information technology (IT) products. They assumed that the relative price of IT products 
compared with non-IT products in Japan has declined in a similar fashion as in the US. They used their 
own IT product deflator, calculated as ((US IT product price)/(US non-IT product price))*(Japan’s 
non-IT product price), instead of Japan’s official statistics. Since the relative price of IT products 
declined more drastically in the US than in Japan, this procedure raises their estimate of the GDP 
growth rate and the TFP growth rate.
9  
Jorgenson and Motohashi adopt this procedure because they believe that quality improvements 
                                                        
8 From the end of 1991 to the end of 2001, Japan accumulated net external assets of 117.7 trillion 
yen (Annual Report of National Accounts (various years), Economic and Social Research Institute, 
Cabinet Office, Government of Japan.) 
9  The lower price of IT products means larger IT investment. This factor reduces the estimate of the 
TFP growth rate.     7
in IT products are not sufficiently taken into account in Japan’s price statistics.
10 Although the authors 
raised an important question, it seems brave to directly apply US relative prices to Japan. We need a 
more rigorous analysis of the international price gap and the size of a hypothetical price decline, which 
is equivalent to actual quality improvements in IT products. 
There are many other differences in estimation procedures between Jorgenson and Motohashi’s 
(2003) study and the other studies. Jorgenson and Motohashi explicitly treat land as a production 
factor, but all the other studies neglect land input. The inclusion of land lowers the cost share of other 
inputs. This difference makes their estimate of TFP growth higher than in the other studies. They also 
include consumer durables and computer software in capital input, which most of the other studies do 
not do. 
Another important study with optimistic results is that of Kawamoto (2004). He found that the 
TFP growth rate for Japan’s private sector in 1990-1998 was 1.9%, which is identical with the TFP 
growth rate he obtained for 1980-1990. This optimistic result is mainly based on the following two 
factors. First, following Basu and Kimball (1997), Kawamoto assumed that the sole cost of changing 
the workweek of capital is a “shift premium” — firms need to pay higher wages to compensate 
employees for working overtime — and used changes in hours per worker as a proxy for unobserved 
changes in both labor effort and capital utilization. Second, he found that there are large diseconomies 
of scale in the non-manufacturing sector. The estimated returns-to-scale coefficient in the 
non-manufacturing sector was 0.65. Since the production share of the non-manufacturing sector 
expanded rapidly in the 1990s, he attributed a substantial part of the productivity growth slowdown to 
the diseconomies of scale instead of to the slowdown in technological progress.
11  
                                                        
10  Colecchia and Schreyer (2002) adopted a similar approach in their comparative analysis of OECD 
countries. 
11  It is interesting to note that even Kawamoto (2004) finds that there was a considerable slowdown 
in TFP growth in the durable manufacturing sector in the 1990s (see Table 2.1).   8
Despite the boldness of his assumption on the “shift premium” he does not validate its 
applicability to the Japanese economy. Although his findings on the large diseconomies of scale in the 
non-manufacturing sector seem to be inconsistent with the actual existence of large firms, he does not 
confirm this finding using firm-level data. Kawamoto raised very interesting issues; but it seems that 
we need more empirical research to verify his surprising results. 
Table 2.1 also shows another important point, which we would like to stress. Many studies, such 
as Yoshikawa and Matsumoto (2001), Nishimura and Minetaki (2003), Miyagawa (2003), Fukao et al. 
(2004), and Kawamoto (2004) found that the slowdown in TFP growth in the manufacturing sector 
was more severe than that in the non-manufacturing sector, even if we take account of changes in 
capacity utilization.
12 While recent studies on Japan’s economic stagnation, such as those on zombie 
firms (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap 2004, and Ahearne and Shinada 2004), have tended to focus on 
the non-manufacturing sector, we need more research on why TFP growth slowed in the 
manufacturing sector. 
To sum up the above brief survey, the decline in TFP growth in Japan during the 1990s seems to 
be more modest than suggested by Hayashi and Prescott. And although the majority of studies show 
                                                        
12 Cabinet Office (2002) and Hattori and Miyazaki (2000) obtain opposite results in their studies. 
Based on growth accounting at the 2-digit industry level, these studies concluded that TFP growth in 
the manufacturing sector did not substantially decline in 1990s. Moreover, the sharp decline of TFP 
growth in the non-manufacturing sector contributed to the slowdown in macro TFP growth in the 
1990s. Probably the following two factors are responsible for the different results. Firstly, the 
Cabinet Office and Hattori and Miyazaki take account neither of changes in capacity utilization in 
non-manufacturing sectors nor of changes in the quality of labor. Secondly, in order to evaluate each 
factor’s contribution to output growth, the Cabinet Office study and the Hattori and Miyazaki study 
use that factor’s distribution share, whereas Nishimura and Minetaki (2003) and Fukao et al. (2004) 
use cost share. In the 1990s, the distribution share of labor was higher than the cost share of labor, 
and labor input in the manufacturing sectors declined more drastically than in non-manufacturing 
sectors. Because of this difference, the Cabinet Office study and the Hattori and Miyazaki study 
arrive at a higher TFP growth in the manufacturing sector.   9
that there was some decline in TFP growth in Japan, we need more empirical research to purify the 
Solow residuals and investigate the extent and nature of the slowdown in TFP growth. Another 
important point is that many studies found that the slowdown in TFP growth in the manufacturing 
sector was more severe than that in the non-manufacturing sector.  
 
3. Decomposition Analysis of TFP Growth in the Manufacturing Sector 
As Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992) and Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (1998) have shown 
in their productivity decomposition analyses, the start-up of productive establishments and the closure 
of unproductive establishments substantially contributed to US TFP growth. As Figure 3.1 shows, the 
start-up rate (number of newly opened establishments/number of all establishments) and the closure 
rate in Japan are about one half of the corresponding values for the US in the 1980s. Moreover, the gap 
widened in the 1990s. In particular, the start-up rate in Japan’s manufacturing sector has declined to 
about 2% in recent years. Probably this factor has contributed to the slowdown in TFP growth in 
Japan’s manufacturing sector. We examine these issues in this section.  
We use the firm-level panel data underlying the Kigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa (Basic Survey of 
Japanese Business Structure and Activities) conducted annually by the Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry (METI).
13 The survey covers all firms with at least 50 employees and 30 million yen of 
paid-in capital in the Japanese manufacturing, mining and commerce sectors. We use the data for 
manufacturing firms. Our data cover the period 1994–2001. After some screening of the data our 
unbalanced panel data consists of 110,856 observations.
14 
                                                        
13 The compilation of the micro-data of the METI survey was conducted as part of the project 
“Foreign Direct Investment in Japan” at the Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. 
14  We exclude all observations with zero values for material costs, compensation of employees, and 
tangible fixed assets from our data set. We also exclude observations with an extremely high or low 
capital-labor ratio. Through this screening process, the number of observations declined by about   10
 
Insert Figure 3.1 
 
Following Good, Nadiri, and Sickles (1997) and Aw, Chen, and Roberts (1997), we define the 
TFP level of firm f in year t in a certain industry in comparison with the TFP level of a hypothetical 
representative firm in year 0 in that industry by
15  
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where Yf, t, Si, f, t, and Xi, f, t denote the gross output of firm f in year t, the cost share of factor i for firm 
f in year t, and firm f’s input of factor i in year t, respectively. The variables with an upper bar denote 
the industry average of that variable. We assume constant returns to scale. As factor inputs, we take 
account of capital, labor and real intermediate inputs. For details on the definition and source of each 
variable, please see Appendix A.
16 Because of the limitation of the data we cannot take account of 
the change in labor quality in our TFP analysis. It is probably because of this difference that we 
arrive at a higher TFP growth estimate than the industry-level result in Fukao et al. (2004). We also 
                                                                                                                                                                    
0.8% in comparison with our original set of observations. 
15 We divide the manufacturing firm data into 30 sets of different industries and evaluated each 
firm’s relative TFP level in relation to the industry average. 
16 The approach used here also tries to deal with the following shortcomings of Nishimura et al. 
(2003). First, Nishimura et al. used value-added instead of gross output as their output measure. As 
Domar (1961) has shown, value-added-based TFP may differ from gross-output-based TFP, which is 
commonly used in theoretical and empirical studies. Second, Nishimura et al. derived real 
value-added using the value-added deflator of the SNA statistics. However, this deflator is based on 
a relatively aggregated industry classification, so that their approach risks underestimating the TFP 
growth of firms in high-tech industries, where output prices decline more rapidly. Compared with 
their approach, we use the more disaggregated deflator of the  Wholesale Price Statistics and 
Corporate Goods Price Statistics.   11
assume that working hours and the capacity utilization rate at each firm are identical with those of 
the industry average. 
We define the representative firm for each industry as a hypothetical firm whose gross output as 
well as input and cost share of all production factors are identical with the industry average. The first 
two terms on the right hand side of equation (2.1) denote the gap between firm f’s TFP level in year t 
and the representative firm’s TFP level in that year. The third and the fourth term denote the gap 
between the representative firm’s TFP level in year t and the representative firm’s TFP level in year 0. 
Therefore, lnTFPf, t in equation (2.1) denotes the gap between firm f’s TFP level in year t and the 
representative firm’s TFP level in year 0.  
Adopting the methodology used by Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992) and Forster, 




t f t TFP TFP , , ln ln ∑ = θ  (2.2) 
where θf, t denotes firm f’s sales share in year t in that industry. Then, as Forster, Haltiwanger and 
Krizan (1998) showed, we can approximate the manufacturing sector’s TFP growth from year τ to 
year t, lnTFP t – lnTFPτ, by the sum of the following five factors.
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where S is the set of firms that stayed in that industry from year τ to year t, N is the set of newly   12
entered firms and X is the set of exited firms.
17  TFP with an upper bar denotes the industry-average 
TFP level.   
Our decomposition result for the period from 1994 to 2001 is reported in Table 3.1. It has been 
pointed out in preceding studies that decomposition results are affected by business cycles.
18 In order 
to take this into account, we also conducted our decomposition on an annual basis. The results are 
reported in Table 3.2.
  The switch-in and switch-out effects in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 denote the 
contribution of those firms that moved from one industry to another to the industry average of the TFP 
level. Table 3.3 compares our results with those of preceding studies for the US, South Korea, and a 
number of European countries. We should note that our decomposition and the decomposition for the 
European countries are based on firm-level data whereas the studies on the US and South Korea are 
based on establishment-level data. 
Insert Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 
Our major findings are as follows. 
 
1.  Both the exit effect (excluding the switch-out effect) and the switch-out effect for the 
manufacturing sector as a whole from 1996 to 2001 were negative and substantially contributed 
to the decline in TFP growth in the manufacturing sector (Table 3.1). The negative exit effect 
                                                        
17 As already mentioned, the METI survey covers only those firms in the manufacturing and the 
commerce sectors that are of a size that is greater than the cut-off level. Thus, our data on firms that 
“exited” includes firms which shrunk or changed their main business from the manufacturing sector 
to other sectors. We should also note that firms, which were merged and became part of another firm, 
are treated as “exited.” 
18 In 1990-2002, there were three official business cycle peaks, February 1991, May 1997, and 
November 2000, and three troughs, October 1993, January 1999, and January 2002. Official peak 
and trough dates are available in Business Cycle Reference Dates, Economic and Social Research 
Institute, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (<http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/>).   13
means that the average TFP level of exiting firms was higher than that of staying firms. Even 
when we decompose TFP growth on an annual basis, we find that the exit effect (including the 
switch-out effect) was negative for all seven years (Table 3.2). It is interesting to note that this 
negative exit effect is not special to Japan. Italy and the Netherlands also experienced a negative 
exit-effect (including the switch-out effect) in 1987-1992. 
2.  Both the entry effect (excluding the switch-in effect) and the switch-in effect were positive in 
almost all the industries (Table 3.1). Moreover, the entry effect (including the switch-in effect) 
was positive in both the upturn and the downturn periods (Table 3.2). But probably as a result of 
the low entry rate, the size of the entry effect was not large. The entry effect (including the 
switch-in effect) increased the TFP level of the manufacturing sector by 1.13% in 1994-2001, 
which is much smaller than Korea’s entry effect in 1990-98 (15.60%) and Italy’s entry effect in 
1987-1992 (5.12%) (Table 3.3).   
3.  The redistribution effect – that is, the between effect plus the covariance effect – was positive 
(0.33%) but relatively small in comparison with that for the other countries (with the exception 
of the Netherlands) (Table 3.3). 
4.  The within effect, i.e. the effect of TFP growth within staying firms, was the largest factor 
among all the effects (Table 3.1). Moreover, this effect changed pro-cyclically (Table 3.2).   
 
The above result suggests that in order to accelerate TFP growth in Japan’s manufacturing 
sector it is important to promote new entries and to make both the exit process and the process of 
resource allocation more efficient. These factors, moreover, are closely related with the allocation of 
funds through the financial system. Therefore, the problems in Japan’s banking system are likely to 
have contributed to the slowdown of Japan’s TFP growth, and their resolution forms an integral part 
of any attempt to raise the TFP growth rate.     14
Unfortunately, the METI survey does not include detailed information on firms’ financial 
affairs, such as each firm’s main bank or its interest payments for borrowing from banks. The only 
available information is firms’ total liability. Using regression analysis based on pooled 
cross-industry data, Fukao and Kwon (2003) found that there is a significant negative correlation 
between the exit effect and that industry’s average liability-asset ratio.
19  That is, in industries where 
the liability-asset ratio is high, the exit effect tends to be negative. There is a possibility that the 
malfunction of Japan’s financial system contributes to the negative exit effect by allowing zombie 
firms to survive while high-productive small firms fail as a result of a credit crunch. 
 
4. Inter-firm Differences in TFP 
Following Japan’s recent economic recovery from the trough of January 2002, it has been 
argued in newspapers and business journals that differences between firms in terms of their business 
performances are increasing. In the case of the manufacturing sector, while large and internationalized 
firms considerably managed to improve their performance, the performance of small and less 
internationalized firms continued to stagnate.  
Figure 4.1 compares the diffusion index (D.I.) of business conditions (“favorable” minus 
“unfavorable”) for large and small manufacturing firms. The figure shows that the gap of the D.I. 
between large and small firms has increased in recent years. While it is not unusual for this gap to 
widen during a recovery, the recent extent is the largest in the past thirty years. Figure 4.2 compares 
the labor productivity (in natural logarithm) of large and medium-sized firms on the one hand and 
small firms on the other. Again, the gap has widened to an unprecedented level.  
                                                        
19 For this cross-industry regression, Fukao and Kwon (2003) divide the manufacturing firm data 
into 58 sets of different industries and estimated the “exit effect” in each industry. Their result is also 
reported in Fukao et al. (2004).   15
These trends suggest that there is a group of firms that has been excluded from recent 
innovations and their stagnation hinders TFP growth in the manufacturing sector. In this section, we 
examine this issue. Using the micro-data of the METI survey we measure the gap in the TFP level 
between a group of high–TFP firms and a group of low–TFP firms and compare the characteristics of 
these two groups. 
 
Insert Figures 4.1 and 4.2 
 
To date, the number of studies on the dispersion of productivity among Japanese firms is very 
limited. Using the same firm-level data of the METI survey, Morikawa (2004) found that there is no 
rising trend in the standard deviation of the current-profit/sales ratio or of the current-profit/total-asset 
ratio of manufacturing firms in the period of 1991-2001. But he also found that the standard deviation 
of sales growth substantially increased in 1991-2001.  
Using firm-level data of publicly traded firms in the Development Bank of Japan (DBJ) 
database, Shinada (2003) studied the technology gap between a group of firms at the technology 
frontier and other firms in the manufacturing and the non-manufacturing sector for the period 
1982-2000. He found that the technology gap widened in the 1990s when compared with the 1980s, 
especially in the electrical machinery and equipment industry and in the automobile and auto-parts 
industry. From the viewpoint of the TFP growth slowdown in the 1990s, Shinada’s finding is very 
interesting.  
A major shortcoming of Shinada’s analysis is that his dataset covers only a limited range of 
activities in the Japanese economy. Compared with the number of all workers in each industry in 2001, 
which we obtain from the Establishment and Enterprise Census for 2001 conducted by the Japanese 
Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, the total of the   16
number of workers employed by the firms covered by the DBJ Database in 2001 is very small. In the 
case of the manufacturing sector, the DBJ Database covers 1,716 firms, accounting only for 24.7% 
(=2,461,384/9,960,231) of the workforce overall. The coverage in the construction sector, in terms of 
workers employed, is only 9.6%, while in the retail and wholesale sector (including eating and 
drinking places) it is 5.9%, in the real estate sector it is 8.1%, and in the service sector it is 5.5%. The 
METI survey covers a much larger number of firms: in the case of the manufacturing sector, the survey 
covers 13,470 firms and 51.4% of the entire workforce. The coverage is still not complete, but much 
better than in the case of the DBJ Database.  
Table 4.1 shows how the TFP level gap (in natural logarithm) between the 75 percentile firm 
and the 25 percentile firm changed over time in each industry in the period 1994-2001. We used the 
same TFP data as in section 3. In the table, we placed industries in which the gap grew by a large 
margin at the top of the table and those in which it declined by a large margin at the bottom. The 
widening of the gap was particularly pronounced in drugs and medicine, petroleum and coal products, 
and electronic data processing machines and electronic equipment. Since the gap widened in 
large-sized industries, such as electronic data processing machines and automobiles, the average gap 
of all the manufacturing industries, which is shown at the bottom of Table 4.1 also increased.
20 In the 
case of the average gap for the whole manufacturing sector, the widening occurred after 1997, the year 
of Japan’s financial crisis. 
According to preceding studies on other countries, the TFP gap moves counter-cyclically over 
time (Bartelsman and Doms 2000). In 2001, the D.I. of business conditions for the whole 
manufacturing sector was -41.8%, which is worse than the D.I. in 1994, -26.3. Therefore, there is some 
risk that the TFP gap in 2001 is partly exaggerated by the recession. But even when we compare the 
TFP gap in 2000, when the D.I. was as high as -11, with the TFP gap in 1994, we can observe an 
                                                        
20  To calculate the average value, we used each industry’s total sales as the weight.   17
increase in the TFP gap in many industries.
21 
 
Insert Table 4.1 
 
Are there any common characteristics among the industries where the TFP gap widened? We 
compared several industry characteristics which we expect to have a close relationship with the 
productivity of firms. Figure 4.3 shows that the TFP gap widened mainly in industries with a high 
R&D intensity and where the internationalization of firms is more advanced (we measure 
internationalization by outward direct investment, the introduction of foreign capital, and 
procurements from abroad).
22, 23 There are statistically significant positive correlations between the 
change of the TFP gap and three of the four characteristics, the R&D/sales ratio, the amount of 
materials purchased from abroad/total amount of materials purchased, and the percentage of firms 
owned by foreign firms. The correlation between the change in the TFP gap and the stock of direct 
investment abroad/total assets was positive but statistically insignificant.  
 
Insert Figure 4.3 
                                                        
21  In order to check the robustness of these results, we also calculated the change of the TFP gap for 
the period 1995-2001. The results are displayed in Table 4.1 and are not qualitatively different.   
22 As measures of industry characteristics, we used average values of pooled firm-data for each 
industry.  
23 The petroleum and coal products industry seems to have different characteristics from the other 
industries where the TFP gap widened. In this industry, the R&D ratio and the stock of direct 
investment abroad/total assets are very low. Probably we can explain the widening of the TFP gap in 
this industry by the deregulation of 1997. Until 1997, imports of specific kinds of petroleum refined 
products were regulated through a system of registration of importers, the Provisional Measures Law 
on the Importation of Specific Kinds of Petroleum Refined Products. The gap between winners and 
losers may have widened as a result of fierce competition after deregulation.   18
 
Next, we compare the characteristics, TFP growth, and the growth rate of sales and employment 
of the top quartile firm-group and the bottom quartile firm-group. For each year and for each industry, 
we select firms, whose TFP level is higher than the 75 percentile TFP level, as the top-quartile firms. 
Panel A of Table 4.2 compares the pooled data of all the top-quartile firms with the pooled data of all 
the bottom-quartile firms. The comparison between the top and the bottom firm-group shows that the 
top firm-group is more internationalized than the bottom firm-group. The top-quartile firms show a 
higher R&D intensity and the ratio of their number of non-production workers/number of all workers 
is 11 percentage points higher than for the bottom-quartile firms. The top-quartile firms are also on 
average 78% (= (exp (5.484-4.906)-1)*100) bigger (measured by the number of workers) and have a 
liability/total asset ratio that is 16 percentage points lower. All these differences are statistically 
significant.  
 
Insert Table 4.2 
 
It is also important to note that a large percentage of top-quartile firms is owned by other 
domestic firms, and this percentage considerably increased after the currency crisis of 1997. In the 
case of the pooled data of 1998-2001, 41 percent of top-quartile firms were majority-owned either by a 
domestic or a foreign firm.  
Table 4.2 also compares the performance of the top–quartile firm-group with the 
bottom–quartile firm-group. The bottom firm-group exhibits a higher growth rate of both TFP and 
sales. This phenomenon can probably be explained either by a convergence mechanism or by 
temporary shocks. Table 4.2 also shows that the bottom-quartile firms reduce their employment more 
rapidly and have a lower return-on-asset ratio.   19
Panel B of Table 4.2 compares the top-quartile firms with the bottom-quartile firms at the 
industry level for six relatively large industries, where the TFP gap substantially widened. We can 
confirm that almost all the above differences between the top and the bottom firm group hold in each 
industry. Panel B also provides a number of further insights. The gaps in R&D intensity, the 
percentage of foreign-owned firms, and in firm size between the top firms and the bottom firms are 
largest in the drugs and medicine industry. The gap in the ratio of the stock of direct investment abroad 
to total assets is largest in the automobile industry, while the gap in the percentage of 
domestically-owned firms is largest in the electronic data processing machines and electronic 
equipment industry. Finally, the gap in the number of non-production workers/number of all workers 
is largest in the communication equipment and related products industry. These diverse patterns of 
gaps among industries suggest that the main factor determining the advantage of the top firms is 
different for different industries. 
Our findings, so far, suggest the following tentative explanation for the recent widening of the 
TFP gap among manufacturing firms. In the 1990s, many Japanese firms, especially large firms in 
high-tech and globalized industries, further pressed ahead with internationalization and intensified 
R&D efforts in order to improve their productivity. In such industries, the reorganization of 
relationships among firms also proceeded through M&As. On the other hand, some firms, mainly 
relatively small and borrowed-up firms, could not follow this innovation process and were left behind 
in their productivity.  
It is important to note that the causality behind these relationships could be the reverse. In other 
words, the relationship may result not from the fact that characteristics such as a high R&D intensity 
and a high degree of internationalization enhance firms’ productivity, but rather that only 
high-productivity firms are able to conduct intensive R&D and internationalize and are targeted in 
mergers and acquisitions. In order to examine this issue, we investigated the determinants of TFP   20
growth using our firm-level data.   Table 4.3 shows descriptive statistics of the variables used for the 
regression analysis. The regression results are reported in Table 4.4.
24  
 
Insert Tables 4.3 and 4.4 
 
We found that greater R&D intensity and internationalization have a positive effect on firms’ 
TFP growth. We also found that larger firms, firms owned by another domestic firm, firms with a 
higher percentage of non-production workers in total workers and a lower liability-asset ratio have 
higher TFP growth. These findings seem to support our hypothesis that a new divide caused by R&D, 
internationalization, and reorganizations of relationships among firms through M&As is emerging and 
growing in Japan’s manufacturing industry.  
Our result also shows that firms with a lower TFP level tend to have higher TFP growth. As we 
have already argued, we can explain this phenomenon either by a convergence mechanism or by 
temporary shocks or noise. Some firms have lower TFP because of a temporary negative shock or 
observation noise but the effect of the shock or the noise disappears in the next period. 
In order to examine whether the determinants of TFP growth have changed in the estimation 
period, we divided the period of 1995-2001 into two sub-periods, 1995-1997 and 1998-2001, and 
estimated specification (4) of Table 4.4 for each sub-period. We did not find considerable changes in 
the estimated coefficients except for a decline of the absolute value of the coefficient on the TFP level 
(the beta-convergence coefficient). Running a regression for 1995-2001 with an additional cross term 
of a dummy variable for 1998-2001 period and the TFP level in year t-1, we tested whether the there 
                                                        
24  Column 5 of Table 4.4 reports the results for the “long difference” estimator. In order to check the 
robustness of our regression results based on annual TFP growth, we regressed the TFP growth from 
1994 to 2001 on the variables for 1994. The results we obtained were qualitatively similar to those 
based on annual TFP growth.   21
was a decline in the absolute value of the beta-convergence coefficient. The result is reported in Table 
4.5. We found that the absolute value of the negative beta-convergence coefficient declined 
significantly in the later sub-period. In the case of specifications (A) and (B) in Table 4.5, the 
coefficient on beta-convergence declined from -0.386 to -0.235. These values mean that the half-life 
of the GDP gap increased from 1.42 years (=ln(0.5)/ln(1-0.386)) in 1995-1997 to 2.59 years 
(=ln(0.5)/ln(1-0.235)) in 1998-2001. We also ran this regression for each industry and found that in 
many industries, the absolute value of the beta-coefficient declined.   
 
Insert Table 4.5 
 
The slowdown of the beta-convergence mechanism seems to have contributed to the widening 
of the TFP dispersion among firms. Until the middle of the 1990s, large firms and many small firms 
were closely tied by sub-contracting and keiretsu relationships and it seems that through this network 
advanced technologies of assemblers and key-component producers were transferred to lower-tier 
small suppliers.
25 But as large firms relocated their production abroad and rationalized their 
procurement processes, this technology-transfer mechanism probably slowed down.  
According to our interview, Toshiba now makes almost all decisions on procurements of parts 
and components for all of its three notebook PC factories at its headquarters in Tokyo taking a global 
viewpoint. Toshiba’s PC factories are located in Hangzhou, China, the Laguna Technopark in the 
Philippines and in Ome, near Tokyo. In the case of Toshiba Hangzhou, the major suppliers are 
Japanese, Taiwanese, and Korean affiliates in China and firms located in East Asia. Another good 
                                                        
25  Using plant-level data for Japan’s automobile industry for 1981-1996, Ito (2002) found that parts 
producers, which were located close to assembler’s plant, tended to achieve higher TFP growth than 
other parts producers.     22
example is Nissan Motors. Based on its “Revival Plan” Nissan Motors drastically reduced the number 
of its suppliers and introduced more competition into its procurement process.  
So far, we found that compared with firms with low TFP, firms with high TFP tend to be more 
R&D intensive and more internationalized. High-TFP firms also typically are larger and have a lower 
liability/total asset ratio. These differences further raise the TFP growth rate of the firms with a high 
TFP level. On the other hand, we also found a mechanism of convergence, which is probably caused 
by technology spillovers and catching up. From a quantitative viewpoint, how much do these two 
factors contribute to the dispersion of TFP among firms? In order to answer this question we need a 
model.
26  Let us assume that specification (4) of Table 4.4 is the correct model and the dynamics of 
firms’ TFP level are determined by this equation.
27 Then, the larger the dispersion of firms’ 
                                                        
26 On theories on the dispersion of firms’ TFP level, see Baily et al. (1992) and Bartelsman and 
Doms (2000).   
27 If we assume that all firm characteristics except the TFP level are exogenously determined and 
constant, then the unconditional standard deviation of the TFP level among firms depends on three 
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where σ denotes the standard deviation of each variable.   
Unfortunately, it seems unrealistic to assume that firms’ characteristics except the TFP level are 
exogenously determined and constant. For this reason, we did not calculate the unconditional 
standard deviation of the TFP level.   23
characteristics, the larger will be the dispersion of the TFP level. Similarly the larger the standard 
deviation of the random shock or the smaller the absolute value of the beta-convergence coefficient, 
the larger will be the unconditional standard deviation of the TFP level.   
In Table 4.6 we compared the size of the random shock, the effect of the beta convergence and 
the divergence effect caused by firms’ characteristics. Table 4.6 shows that the disparity of firms’ 
characteristics between the top quartile firm-group and the bottom quartile firm-group continuously 
worked to widen the TFP gap between the two groups by about 1% a year. On the other hand, the 
beta-convergence mechanism became weak in the period 1998-2001. There was no considerable 
change in the size of random shocks. 
 
Insert Table 4.6 
 
Next we show the degree of persistence of firms’ relative productivity level among continuing 
firms. Table 4.7 shows the transition matrix. According to this table, the degree of persistence is very 
high. More than one-half of firms which originally ranked in the bottom three deciles in 1994 
remained in the same three deciles in 2001. Similarly more than one-half of firms which originally 
ranked in the top three deciles in 1994 remained in the same three deciles in 2001.
28  
 
Insert Table 4.7 
 
If the bottom firms reduce employment or exit and the top firms stay and expand employment, 
the macro-level TFP will increase. To conclude this section, we analyze this “metabolism” issue. 
                                                        
28  In the case of plant-level TFP in the US manufacturing sector, several studies have shown that the 
degree of persistence is very high (Baily et. al 1992, Bartelsman and Doms 2000).   24
Table 4.8 compares firms’ employment growth and firm “exits” between the top firm-group and the 
bottom firm-group. The table shows that the reduction of the number of workers by the low–TFP 
firms is not much larger than the reduction by the high–TFP firms. Thus, while we might expect that 
high-TFP firms would be expanding employment and output, this is not the case. The likely reasons 
are that high-TFP firms are in the process of restructuring their activities and many of them are 
relocating production abroad. This finding suggests that the “metabolism” – the expansion of 
employment and output by high-TFP firms and the contraction or exit of low-TFP firms – is not 
working well in Japan’s manufacturing sector.  
 
Insert Table 4.8 
 
5. Conclusion 
Our results can be summarized as follows. Using firm-level data of the METI survey, we 
examined why Japan’s TFP growth slowed down in the manufacturing sector. Our decomposition 
analysis showed that the exit effect was negative and substantially contributed to the decline in TFP 
growth in the manufacturing sector. The negative exit effect means that the average TFP level of 
exiting firms was higher than that of staying firms. We also found that although both the entry effect 
and the redistribution effect were positive, they were very small when compared with those in other 
countries. This “low metabolism” seems to have slowed down the TFP growth of the manufacturing 
sector.  
In section 4 we measured the gap of the TFP level between a group of high–TFP firms and a 
group of low–TFP firms and compared the characteristics of these two groups. We found that the TFP 
gap between the 75 percentile firm and the 25 percentile firm is widening in many industries where 
R&D intensity is high and the internationalization of firms is more advanced.   The TFP gap seems to   25
be widening because high–TFP firms tend to have a higher R&D intensity, a higher degree of 
internationalization, are larger, and have a lower liability-asset ratio, and these characteristics enhance 
their productivity further. It is also important to note that a large percentage of top–quartile firms are 
owned by other domestic firms. In the case of the pooled data for 1998-2001, 41 percent of top quartile 
firms were majority owned either by a domestic a foreign firm. We also found that the catching-up 
mechanism of low-productive firms slowed down after 1997.   
   26
Appendix A: Definition of Variables Used in the Econometric Analysis and Data Sources 
We used each firm’s total sales and cost of intermediate inputs as nominal gross output and 
nominal intermediate input data. We derived the deflator for each industry’s gross output and 
intermediate input from the Bank of Japan’s Wholesale Price Statistics and Corporate Goods Price 
Statistics. 
For capital stock, the only data available are the nominal book values of tangible fixed assets in 
the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities. Using these data, we calculated the net 
capital stock of firm f in industry j in constant 1995 prices as follows: 
) / ( jt jt ft ft IBV INK BV K ∗ =  
where BVft represents the book value of firm f’s tangible fixed capital in year t, INKjt stands for the 
net capital stock of industry j in constant 1995 prices, and IBVjt denotes the book value of industry 
j’s capital. INKjt is calculated as follows. First, as a benchmark, we took the data on the book value 
of tangible fixed assets of year 1976 from the Census of Manufactures 1976 published by METI. We 
then converted the book value of year 1976 into the real value in constant 1995 prices using the net 
fixed assets deflator provided in the Annual Report on National Accounts published by the Cabinet 
Office, Government of Japan. Second, the net capital stock of industry j, INKjt, for succeeding years 
was calculated using the perpetual inventory method. We used the capital formation deflator in the 
Annual Report on National Accounts and Masuda’s (2000) estimate of the depreciation rate of 
0.0792 for the calculation. 
In order to obtain capital input, we multiplied the net capital stock by the capital utilization ratio 
of each industry provided in the JIP database.
29  
                                                        
29 The JIP Database was compiled as part of an ESRI (Economic and Social Research Institute, 
Cabinet Office, Government of Japan) research project. The detailed result of this project is reported 
in Fukao, Miyagawa, Kawai, Inui (2004). The database contains annual information on 84 sectors, 
including 49 non-manufacturing sectors, from 1970 to 1998. These sectors cover the whole Japanese   27
As labor input, we used each firm’s total number of workers multiplied by the sectoral 
working-hours from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare’s Monthly Labor Survey. We were not 
able to take account of differences in labor quality among firms, though it seems fair to assume that a 
group of high-TFP firms probably tend to employ more educated workers. Our estimates of TFP level 
might be biased upwards for high-TFP firms as a result of this neglect of the labor quality. 
Finally, we derived the cost shares of the factors of production. For labor cost, we used the wage 
data provided in the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities. Intermediate input 
cost is defined as total production cost plus cost of sales and general management minus wages minus 
depreciation. Capital cost was calculated by multiplying the real net capital stock with the user cost of 
















where  τ δ, , ,r q  and  z  are the prices of investment goods, interest rates, depreciation rates, 
corporate tax rates, and the present values of depreciation deduction on a unit of nominal investment, 
respectively. Data on investment goods prices, interest rates, and corporate tax rates were taken from 
the  Annual Report on National Accounts,  the  Ministry of Finance Statistics Monthly. The 
depreciation rate for each industry is estimated using the book value of tangible fixed assets at the 
beginning of year t  and the depreciation expense during year t in the Census of Manufactures 
published by METI.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
economy. The database includes detailed information on factor inputs, annual nominal and real 
input-output tables, and some additional statistics, such as R&D stock, capacity utilization rate, 
Japan’s international trade statistics by trade partner, inward and outward FDI, etc., at the detailed 
sectoral level. An Excel file version (in Japanese) of the JIP Database is available on ESRI’s web 
site.   28
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Table 2.1 Comparison of Empirical Studies on Japan's TFP growth in 1990s
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Cost shareFigure 3.1 Start-up and Closure Rate of Establishments: Japan-US Comparison
Both the US and the Japanese data are based on statistics of employment insurance program. 
Sources: Small Business Administration, US Government (1998), Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, Ministry of
Industry, Trade and Industry, Japanese Government (2001), and Study Group on “Industry Hollowing-out” and Tariff
Policy, Ministry of Finance, Jap
Figure 4.1.Panel A. Start-up Rate:


























































































Figure 4.2.Panel B. Closure Rate:























































































































a bc d=a+b+c efgh i=e+f+g+h j=d+i
1 Food 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.006 -0.005 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.005
2 Textiles  -0.008 -0.002 0.007 -0.002 0.007 -0.027 0.001 0.000 -0.019 -0.020
3 Wood and furniture  0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.004 -0.017 0.001 -0.015 -0.027 -0.028
4 Pulp and paper  0.007 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.007
5 Printing and publishing 0.008 -0.001 0.003 0.011 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.020
6 Industrial chemicals and chemical fibers 0.007 0.001 0.002 0.010 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.011
7 Oils and paints 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.005
8 Drugs and medicine 0.073 0.005 0.022 0.100 0.010 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.010 0.110
9 Other chemical products 0.016 0.001 0.000 0.017 0.007 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.012 0.028
10 Petroleum and coal products  0.027 0.015 0.014 0.056 0.000 -0.010 0.000 0.000 -0.010 0.046
11 Plastic products -0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.005 -0.001 0.006 0.005
12 Rubber products -0.024 0.002 0.000 -0.022 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.022
13 Ceramics 0.013 -0.003 0.003 0.013 0.002 -0.004 0.003 0.008 0.009 0.022
14 Iron and steel  0.003 -0.005 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002
15 Non-ferrous metals and products 0.008 -0.001 0.002 0.009 -0.006 -0.005 0.001 -0.001 -0.011 -0.002
16 Fabricated metal products -0.009 -0.006 0.006 -0.009 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.009
17 Metal working machinery 0.037 -0.002 0.015 0.050 0.009 0.000 0.012 -0.007 0.015 0.065
18 Special industrial machinery 0.022 -0.003 -0.002 0.017 0.003 -0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.018
19 Office, service industry and household machines 0.040 -0.001 0.009 0.048 0.013 0.000 0.045 -0.002 0.055 0.103
20 Miscellaneous machinery and machine parts -0.005 -0.002 0.002 -0.005 0.003 -0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.006
21 Industrial electric apparatus -0.015 -0.005 0.002 -0.018 0.005 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.018
22 Household electric appliances 0.015 -0.002 -0.002 0.010 0.007 0.001 0.005 -0.002 0.010 0.020
23 Communication equipment and related products 0.071 -0.001 0.010 0.081 0.008 0.003 0.108 0.002 0.120 0.201
24 Electronic data processing machines and electronic equipment 0.026 0.003 0.005 0.033 0.008 -0.002 0.004 -0.012 -0.002 0.031
25 Electronic parts and devices 0.044 -0.001 0.010 0.053 0.017 -0.008 0.007 -0.002 0.014 0.067
26 Miscellaneous electrical machinery and supplies 0.014 0.000 0.004 0.017 0.033 -0.012 0.011 -0.007 0.025 0.042
27 Motor vehicles 0.018 0.000 0.005 0.023 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022
28 Miscellaneous transportation equipment 0.040 0.000 0.002 0.041 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.011 0.052
29 Precision instruments 0.017 -0.002 0.011 0.026 0.011 0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.016 0.041
30 Other manufacturing -0.005 0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.046 -0.005 0.009 -0.004 0.046 0.045
Weighted average of all the industries 0.012 -0.001 0.004 0.015 0.006 -0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.006 0.021
Share of each effect in industry's TFP growth 0.56 -0.04 0.20 0.71 0.28 -0.17 0.25 -0.07 0.29 1.00
























a=b+c+f b c=d+e de f=g+h g hij
1994-1995 0.029 0.024 0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.005 0.006 -0.003 0.006 -0.003
1995-1996 0.011 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.005 -0.005
1996-1997 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.004 0.004 -0.004
1997-1998 -0.007 -0.008 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 -0.003 0.002 -0.001
1998-1999 0.011 0.010 0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.003 0.002 -0.002
1999-2000 0.017 0.013 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004 -0.004 0.002 -0.001
2000-2001 -0.005 -0.008 0.003 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.003 -0.003
Note: The entry and exit effect in this paper include the switch-in and switch-out effect, respectively.
TFP growth
total Period
Contribution of each effect




















a=b+c+f b c=d+e d ef = g+h g h
Ahn, Kwon, Fukao (2004) Korea Establishment 1990-98 28.1 11.35 0.63 -2.28 2.90 16.11 15.60 0.50
(0.40) (0.02) (-0.08) (0.10) (0.57) (0.56) (0.02)
Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (1998) USA Establishment 1977-87 10.2 4.92 2.66 -0.82 3.48 2.66
(0.48) (0.26) (-0.08) (0.34) (0.26)
This paper Japan Firm 1994-2001   2.1 1.20 0.33 -0.09 0.42 0.61 1.13 -0.52
(0.56) (0.15) (-0.04) (0.20) (0.29) (0.53) (-0.24)
Barnes, Haskell, and Maliranta (2001) Finland Firm 1987-92 5.4 -5.08 6.37 2.86 3.51 4.10 2.92 1.19
(-0.94) (1.18) (0.53) (0.65) (0.76) (0.54) (0.22)
France Firm 1987-92 -7.7 -10.16 1.46 1.62 -0.15 1.00 0.92 0.08
(1.32) (-0.19) (-0.21) (0.02) (-0.13) (-0.12) (-0.01)
Italy Firm 1987-92 15.5 8.22 2.17 3.57 -1.40 5.12 5.43 -0.31
(0.53) (0.14) (0.23) (-0.09) (0.33) (0.35) (-0.02)
Netherlands Firm 1987-92 2.7 4.16 -0.16 2.46 -2.62 -1.30 0.16 -1.46
(1.54) (-0.06) (0.91) (-0.97) (-0.48) (0.06) (-0.54)
UK Firm 1987-92 -4.5 -6.93 1.40 -1.04 2.43 1.04 0.23 0.77
(1.54) (-0.31) (0.23) (-0.54) (-0.23) (-0.05) (-0.17)
Notes: The entry and exit effects in this paper and in Ahn, Kwon, and Fukao (2004) include the switch-in and switch-out effects, respectively. Values in parentheses denote the share of each
effect in total TFP growth.
Table 3.3 Comparison of Total Factor Productivity Decompositions of Each Country's Manufacturing Sector Based on Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan Method




Contribution of each effectSource: Bank of Japan 'Tankan (Short-term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan)'
Figure 4.1 Diffusion Index of Business Conditions ("Favorable" minus "Unfavorable") in the Manufacturing
Sector: by Firm Size
Notes: The BOJ revised the Tankan from the March 2003 survey onwards. In the case of the December 2003 survey, both
the data based on the old format and the data based on the new format are available. Using these data we linked the
statistics before and after the revision.
Before March 2004, small firms are defined as firms with 50-299 employees and large firms are defined as firms with 1000 employees or
more. After March 2004, small firms are defined as firms capitalized at 20 million yen or more to less than 100 million yen and large firms






































































































































Large minus SmallSource: Ministry of Finance Statistics Monthly: Annual Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations ,
Figure 4.2 Labor Productivity in the Manufacturing Sector: by Firm Size, Logarithm of
Value Added (in Million Yen) per Worker
Notes: Small firms are defined as firms capitalized at 10 million yen or more to less than 100 million yen.












































































































Drugs and medicine 0.158 0.165 0.180 0.201 0.197 0.207 0.227 0.216 0.058 0.021
Petroleum and coal products 0.123 0.121 0.142 0.197 0.164 0.155 0.193 0.176 0.053 0.030
Electronic data processing machines and electronic equipment 0.164 0.182 0.180 0.178 0.181 0.189 0.193 0.208 0.044 0.060
Electronic parts and devices 0.149 0.150 0.150 0.153 0.151 0.168 0.167 0.190 0.042 0.055
Miscellaneous transportation equipment 0.104 0.103 0.107 0.117 0.193 0.151 0.108 0.142 0.038 0.014
Other manufacturing 0.119 0.127 0.128 0.128 0.131 0.139 0.153 0.155 0.036 0.018
Oils and paints 0.094 0.088 0.098 0.092 0.101 0.101 0.145 0.129 0.035 0.010
Non-ferrous metals and products 0.100 0.085 0.096 0.093 0.097 0.104 0.117 0.122 0.022 0.024
Miscellaneous electrical machinery and supplies 0.132 0.120 0.115 0.127 0.117 0.141 0.138 0.154 0.022 0.013
Motor vehicles 0.100 0.099 0.101 0.103 0.106 0.114 0.114 0.120 0.020 0.135
Communication equipment and related products 0.167 0.183 0.156 0.154 0.181 0.156 0.166 0.186 0.019 0.037
Household electric appliances 0.124 0.116 0.114 0.110 0.128 0.142 0.153 0.136 0.012 0.008
Rubber products 0.122 0.121 0.124 0.122 0.115 0.128 0.138 0.131 0.009 0.010
Plastic products 0.106 0.096 0.109 0.100 0.105 0.111 0.115 0.115 0.009 0.027
Office, service industry and household machines 0.130 0.147 0.135 0.119 0.125 0.133 0.131 0.137 0.007 0.018
Fabricated metal products 0.123 0.119 0.112 0.107 0.116 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.006 0.053
Textiles 0.186 0.189 0.201 0.196 0.199 0.199 0.193 0.188 0.002 0.024
Industrial chemicals and chemical fibers 0.115 0.100 0.106 0.108 0.111 0.109 0.104 0.114 -0.001 0.042
Wood and furniture 0.112 0.099 0.099 0.097 0.095 0.094 0.110 0.109 -0.003 0.014
Special industrial machinery 0.120 0.124 0.112 0.111 0.106 0.117 0.135 0.117 -0.003 0.024
Pulp and paper 0.102 0.090 0.089 0.087 0.097 0.097 0.105 0.098 -0.004 0.025
Food 0.132 0.122 0.118 0.111 0.116 0.113 0.117 0.128 -0.004 0.119
Printing and publishing 0.157 0.141 0.145 0.137 0.136 0.141 0.153 0.151 -0.005 0.039
Miscellaneous machinery and machine parts 0.127 0.113 0.111 0.119 0.119 0.138 0.125 0.119 -0.008 0.043
Industrial electric apparatus 0.139 0.136 0.140 0.124 0.139 0.146 0.155 0.130 -0.009 0.030
Other chemical products 0.126 0.123 0.124 0.138 0.132 0.138 0.129 0.117 -0.009 0.017
Precision instruments 0.160 0.137 0.152 0.133 0.149 0.148 0.143 0.149 -0.011 0.016
Iron and steel 0.118 0.089 0.088 0.083 0.117 0.112 0.097 0.106 -0.011 0.038
Ceramics 0.140 0.123 0.132 0.123 0.123 0.114 0.124 0.126 -0.014 0.026
Metal working machinery 0.185 0.130 0.112 0.101 0.139 0.139 0.149 0.128 -0.057 0.009
Weighted average of all the industries 0.130 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.130 0.134 0.137 0.141 0.011 1.000
Table 4.1 TFP Level Gap between the 75 Percentile Firm and the 25 Percentile Firm; by Industry and by YearFigure 4.3 Change in TFP Gap by Industry and Industry Characteristics: 1994-200





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A B B-A C D D-C E F F-E
Amount of materials purchased from abroad/total amount of materials purchased 0.019 0.044 *** 0.025 0.021 0.043 *** 0.022 0.018 0.046 *** 0.028
Stock of direct investment abroad/total assets 0.004 0.010 *** 0.006 0.004 0.009 *** 0.005 0.005 0.012 *** 0.007
Number of non-production workers/number of all workers 0.277 0.390 *** 0.112 0.285 0.403 *** 0.118 0.269 0.378 *** 0.109
R&D intensity (R&D investment/total sales) 0.006 0.013 *** 0.007 0.006 0.013 *** 0.007 0.006 0.014 *** 0.008
Number of years passed since being established 35.383 36.901 *** 1.517 33.964 35.973 *** 2.009 36.824 37.692 *** 0.868
ln(number of workers) 4.906 5.484 *** 0.577 4.932 5.471 *** 0.539 4.880 5.498 *** 0.618
Total liability/total asset 0.803 0.642 *** -0.161 0.821 0.654 *** -0.167 0.784 0.631 *** -0.154
Number of firms majority-owned by a single foreign firm/total number of firms 0.004 0.019 *** 0.015 0.005 0.018 *** 0.014 0.003 0.020 *** 0.017
Firms majority-owned by a single domestic firm/total number of firms 0.218 0.356 *** 0.138 0.221 0.323 *** 0.102 0.215 0.389 *** 0.173
TFP growth rate 0.034 -0.021 *** -0.055 0.045 -0.017 *** -0.061 0.025 -0.025 *** -0.050
Growth rate of real sales 0.020 -0.015 *** -0.035 0.044 0.013 *** -0.031 0.001 -0.038 *** -0.038
Growth rate of employment -0.031 -0.001 *** 0.030 -0.020 0.006 *** 0.027 -0.040 -0.007 *** 0.033
Return on asset (ROA) 0.013 0.083 *** 0.070 0.016 0.087 *** 0.071 0.011 0.081 *** 0.070
1998－2001
Table 4.2. Panel A. Comparison of Firms' Average Characteristics between the Top Firm Group and the Bottom Firm Group: All Manufacturing Firms
Notes: *P=.10, **P=.05, ***P=0.01. In the t-tests heteroscedasticity among different percentile groups were taken account of.
rms' Average Characteristics between the Top Firm Group and the Bottom Firm Gro















A B B-A C D D-C E F F-E
Amount of materials purchased from abroad/total amount of materials purchased 0.027 0.177 *** 0.151 0.034 0.216 *** 0.181 0.027 0.168 *** 0.141
Stock of direct investment abroad/total assets 0.002 0.013 *** 0.011 0.002 0.010 *** 0.008 0.002 0.013 *** 0.012
Number of non-production workers/number of all workers 0.474 0.664 *** 0.190 0.487 0.662 *** 0.176 0.450 0.681 *** 0.232
R&D intensity (R&D investment/total sales) 0.036 0.071 *** 0.035 0.042 0.067 *** 0.026 0.029 0.075 *** 0.045
Number of years passed since being established 42.719 49.184 *** 6.465 41.423 43.357 1.934 44.730 51.526 *** 6.796
ln(number of workers) 5.083 6.716 *** 1.634 5.171 6.579 *** 1.408 4.928 6.841 *** 1.913
Total liability/total asset 0.689 0.436 *** -0.253 0.684 0.474 *** -0.210 0.708 0.411 *** -0.298
Number of firms majority-owned by a single foreign firm/total number of firms 0.017 0.149 *** 0.132 0.023 0.146 *** 0.122 0.009 0.161 *** 0.152
Firms majority-owned by a single domestic firm/total number of firms 0.182 0.229 * 0.047 0.178 0.169 -0.009 0.180 0.275 ** 0.095
TFP growth rate 0.032 0.003 *** -0.029 0.019 0.010 *** -0.009 0.042 -0.003 *** -0.045
Growth rate of real sales 0.027 0.033 0.006 -0.002 0.033 * 0.036 0.050 0.033 -0.017
Growth rate of employment -0.008 0.008 0.016 -0.012 0.008 0.020 -0.005 0.008 0.014
















A B B-A C D D-C E F F-E
Amount of materials purchased from abroad/total amount of materials purchased 0.028 0.061 *** 0.033 0.025 0.067 *** 0.042 0.030 0.057 ** 0.027
Stock of direct investment abroad/total assets 0.007 0.012 *** 0.005 0.007 0.011 ** 0.004 0.007 0.014 ** 0.007
Number of non-production workers/number of all workers 0.198 0.278 *** 0.080 0.198 0.273 *** 0.075 0.198 0.283 *** 0.085
R&D intensity (R&D investment/total sales) 0.006 0.010 ** 0.003 0.004 0.009 *** 0.004 0.009 0.010 0.002
Number of years passed since being established 36.302 37.576 1.274 34.337 36.783 ** 2.446 38.794 37.925 -0.869
ln(number of workers) 4.924 5.374 *** 0.450 4.915 5.490 *** 0.575 4.930 5.282 *** 0.352
Total liability/total asset 0.768 0.661 *** -0.107 0.787 0.677 *** -0.110 0.745 0.635 *** -0.110
Number of firms majority-owned by a single foreign firm/total number of firms 0.012 0.018 0.006 0.009 0.015 0.006 0.016 0.022 0.006
Firms majority-owned by a single domestic firm/total number of firms 0.285 0.475 *** 0.190 0.286 0.440 *** 0.154 0.280 0.514 *** 0.234
TFP growth rate 0.028 -0.024 *** -0.052 0.034 -0.028 *** -0.063 0.024 -0.020 *** -0.044
Growth rate of real sales 0.004 -0.019 ** -0.023 0.032 0.008 -0.024 -0.018 -0.040 -0.022
Growth rate of employment -0.034 0.002 *** 0.035 -0.019 0.009 *** 0.028 -0.045 -0.005 *** 0.041
















A B B-A C D D-C E F F-E
Amount of materials purchased from abroad/total amount of materials purchased 0.027 0.050 *** 0.023 0.022 0.035 0.013 0.016 0.057 *** 0.041
Stock of direct investment abroad/total assets 0.007 0.014 *** 0.006 0.007 0.013 ** 0.006 0.008 0.015 * 0.007
Number of non-production workers/number of all workers 0.221 0.415 *** 0.194 0.216 0.431 *** 0.215 0.214 0.424 *** 0.209
R&D intensity (R&D investment/total sales) 0.008 0.021 *** 0.013 0.008 0.024 *** 0.016 0.007 0.023 *** 0.015
Number of years passed since being established 29.724 36.618 *** 6.894 29.627 35.917 *** 6.290 32.075 36.599 *** 4.524
ln(number of workers) 4.996 5.841 *** 0.845 4.950 5.861 *** 0.911 4.835 5.990 *** 1.155
Total liability/total asset 0.820 0.682 *** -0.138 0.814 0.656 *** -0.158 0.782 0.685 *** -0.096
Number of firms majority-owned by a single foreign firm/total number of firms 0.000 0.005 * 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.010 * 0.010
Firms majority-owned by a single domestic firm/total number of firms 0.340 0.478 *** 0.137 0.309 0.436 *** 0.127 0.295 0.527 *** 0.233
TFP growth rate 0.092 0.019 *** -0.074 0.091 0.018 *** -0.072 0.094 0.019 *** -0.075
Growth rate of real sales 0.090 0.052 ** -0.038 0.132 0.070 ** -0.062 0.056 0.037 -0.019
Growth rate of employment -0.034 -0.004 *** 0.029 -0.012 -0.003 0.009 -0.052 -0.005 *** 0.046
Return on asset (ROA) 0.019 0.077 *** 0.059 0.015 0.105 *** 0.090 0.015 0.065 *** 0.050




Communication Equipment and Related Products




















A B B-A C D D-C E F F-E
Amount of materials purchased from abroad/total amount of materials purchased 0.021 0.068 *** 0.047 0.020 0.066 *** 0.045 0.021 0.073 *** 0.052
Stock of direct investment abroad/total assets 0.010 0.016 ** 0.007 0.012 0.019 * 0.007 0.009 0.016 0.006
Number of non-production workers/number of all workers 0.297 0.485 *** 0.188 0.303 0.459 *** 0.155 0.287 0.504 *** 0.217
R&D intensity (R&D investment/total sales) 0.014 0.026 *** 0.012 0.012 0.028 *** 0.016 0.016 0.025 ** 0.008
Number of years passed since being established 28.483 28.846 0.363 27.995 28.044 0.049 29.412 28.422 -0.990
ln(number of workers) 5.033 6.032 *** 1.000 5.088 6.185 *** 1.097 4.973 5.897 *** 0.924
Total liability/total asset 0.761 0.710 ** -0.050 0.764 0.715 -0.049 0.737 0.717 -0.020
Number of firms majority-owned by a single foreign firm/total number of firms 0.002 0.037 *** 0.034 0.005 0.024 0.020 0.000 0.039 *** 0.039
Firms majority-owned by a single domestic firm/total number of firms 0.243 0.574 *** 0.331 0.244 0.541 *** 0.298 0.216 0.627 *** 0.412
TFP growth rate 0.019 -0.031 *** -0.051 0.042 -0.007 *** -0.049 0.002 -0.050 *** -0.052
Growth rate of real sales 0.084 0.050 -0.035 0.126 0.118 -0.008 0.052 -0.003 * -0.055
Growth rate of employment -0.030 0.000 *** 0.030 -0.022 0.012 ** 0.035 -0.037 -0.010 0.027
















A B B-A C D D-C E F F-E
Amount of materials purchased from abroad/total amount of materials purchased 0.025 0.076 *** 0.051 0.025 0.068 *** 0.043 0.026 0.073 *** 0.046
Stock of direct investment abroad/total assets 0.007 0.016 *** 0.009 0.005 0.016 *** 0.011 0.010 0.015 *** 0.005
Number of non-production workers/number of all workers 0.175 0.288 *** 0.113 0.184 0.290 *** 0.106 0.162 0.290 *** 0.128
R&D intensity (R&D investment/total sales) 0.008 0.014 *** 0.006 0.008 0.014 *** 0.006 0.008 0.014 *** 0.006
Number of years passed since being established 24.865 28.387 *** 3.522 23.870 27.216 *** 3.346 25.834 28.380 *** 2.546
ln(number of workers) 5.173 5.908 *** 0.735 5.197 5.933 *** 0.736 5.126 5.942 *** 0.817
Total liability/total asset 0.861 0.694 *** -0.167 0.886 0.737 *** -0.148 0.833 0.687 *** -0.146
Number of firms majority-owned by a single foreign firm/total number of firms 0.013 0.025 ** 0.012 0.016 0.026 0.010 0.012 0.018 0.006
Firms majority-owned by a single domestic firm/total number of firms 0.397 0.594 *** 0.197 0.395 0.581 *** 0.186 0.428 0.648 *** 0.220
TFP growth rate 0.059 -0.013 *** -0.073 0.078 0.001 *** -0.077 0.046 -0.024 *** -0.069
Growth rate of real sales 0.092 0.028 *** -0.063 0.158 0.108 *** -0.050 0.045 -0.028 *** -0.073
Growth rate of employment -0.031 0.006 *** 0.037 -0.005 0.025 *** 0.029 -0.050 -0.007 *** 0.043
















A B B-A C D D-C E F F-E
Amount of materials purchased from abroad/total amount of materials purchased 0.011 0.015 * 0.004 0.011 0.013 0.002 0.009 0.017 ** 0.008
Stock of direct investment abroad/total assets 0.006 0.023 *** 0.017 0.004 0.019 *** 0.015 0.007 0.027 *** 0.020
Number of non-production workers/number of all workers 0.225 0.262 *** 0.036 0.238 0.266 *** 0.028 0.211 0.257 *** 0.046
R&D intensity (R&D investment/total sales) 0.005 0.012 *** 0.007 0.004 0.011 *** 0.007 0.006 0.013 *** 0.008
Number of years passed since being established 35.292 39.009 *** 3.717 32.969 37.703 *** 4.733 36.982 40.395 *** 3.413
ln(number of workers) 5.015 6.011 *** 0.996 5.044 5.933 *** 0.889 4.973 6.096 *** 1.122
Total liability/total asset 0.821 0.645 *** -0.177 0.846 0.665 *** -0.182 0.803 0.624 *** -0.179
Number of firms majority-owned by a single foreign firm/total number of firms 0.003 0.008 ** 0.005 0.003 0.010 * 0.006 0.002 0.007 0.004
Firms majority-owned by a single domestic firm/total number of firms 0.262 0.319 *** 0.057 0.260 0.294 0.034 0.252 0.344 *** 0.092
TFP growth rate 0.019 -0.024 *** -0.043 0.012 -0.038 *** -0.050 0.025 -0.013 *** -0.038
Growth rate of real sales 0.028 -0.004 *** -0.032 0.029 0.001 *** -0.028 0.027 -0.007 *** -0.034
Growth rate of employment -0.022 0.000 *** 0.022 -0.013 0.003 * 0.016 -0.028 -0.002 *** 0.026
Return on asset (ROA) 0.019 0.082 *** 0.063 0.017 0.109 *** 0.092 0.015 0.073 *** 0.059
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1994－2001 1994－1997 1998－2001Sample size Sample average
Standard
deviation
Minimum value Maximum value
TFP level 109,882 -0.029 0.134 -4.511 1.450
Growth rate of TFP level 84,923 0.004 0.091 -3.547 4.565
Domestic-affiliate dummy (majority-owned by a
single domestic firm)
109,882 0.278 0.448 0 1
Foreign-ownership dummy (majority-owned by a
single foreign firm)
109,882 0.008 0.089 0 1
Amount of materials purchased from abroad/total
amount of materials purchased
108,193 0.028 0.110 0 1
Stock of direct investment abroad/total assets 109,882 0.007 0.027 0 0.792
Number of non-production workers/number of all
workers
109,882 0.330 0.249 0 1
R&D investment/total sales 109,882 0.009 0.021 0 1.639
No. of years passed since being established 109,882 36.814 15.315 0 111
ln (no. of workers) 109,882 5.172 0.975 3.912 11.254
Total liability/total assets 109,882 0.726 0.302 0 11.653
Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used for the Regression Analysis on the Determinants of TFP GrowthDependent variable: ln(TFP)t-ln(TFP)t-1
-0.2935 *** -0.3022 *** -0.2964 *** -0.3024 ***
(-15.46) (-15.38) (-15.25) (-15.42)
0.0122 *** 0.0125 ***
(12.44) (13.29)
0.0229 *** 0.0186 ***
(4.99) (3.93)
0.0172 *** 0.0160 ***
(5.29) (4.76)
0.0191 * 0.0319 ***
(1.77) (2.92)
0.0180 *** 0.0194 *** 0.0166 *** 0.0182 ***
(10.18) (10.80) (9.77) (10.41)
0.1545 *** 0.1504 *** 0.1401 *** 0.1440 ***
(3.36) (3.28) (3.03) (3.12)
-0.0039 *** -0.0042 *** -0.0035 *** -0.0039 ***
(-4.32) (-4.71) (-3.98) (-4.40)
-0.0002 *** 0.0000 ** -0.0002 *** 0.0000 *
(-7.20) (-1.97) (-7.73) (-1.91)
0.0076 *** 0.0069 *** 0.0072 *** 0.0065 ***
(15.41) (15.08) (15.34) (14.60)
-0.0094 *** -0.0076 *** -0.0095 ***
(-4.35) (-3.71) (-4.47)
-0.0305 *** -0.0270 *** -0.0219 *** -0.0248 ***
(-8.63) (-8.86) (-7.48) (-8.29)
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 84923 84923 83494 83494
R-squared 0.1858 0.1897 0.1871 0.1905
Notes: The values in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics .
*P=.10, **P=.05, ***P=0.01
(No. of years passed since being established)t-1
ln (no. of workers)t-1
(Total liability/total assets)t-1
Intercept
(Number of non-production workers/number of all workers)t-1
(Amount of materials purchased from abroad/total amount of materials
purchased)t-1
(R&D investment/total sales)t-1
(Dummy for firms which do not report R&D expenditure) t-1
Table 4.4 Determinants of TFP Growth: 1995-2001, All Manufacturing Firms           
(Domestic-affiliate dummy (majority-owned by a single domestic firm))t-1
(Foreign-ownership dummy (majority-owned by a single foreign firm))t-1
(Stock of direct investment abroad/total assets)t-1
ln(TFP)t-1
(1) (2) (3) (4)All manufacturing -0.386 *** -0.235 *** -0.377 *** -0.004 ** 0.137 ***
Food -0.242 *** -0.171 *** -0.239 *** -0.017 *** 0.066 **
Textiles -0.278 *** -0.132 *** -0.262 *** -0.022 *** 0.116 *
Wood and furniture  -0.278 *** -0.320 *** -0.271 *** -0.019 *** -0.050
Pulp and paper -0.381 *** -0.382 *** -0.380 *** -0.005 0.000
Printing and publishing -0.566 *** -0.160 *** -0.540 *** -0.023 *** 0.352 **
Industrial chemicals and chemical fiber -0.228 *** -0.169 *** -0.227 *** -0.017 *** 0.057
Oils and paints -0.462 *** -0.116 ** -0.567 *** 0.008 0.407 ***
Drugs and medicines -0.066 -0.272 *** -0.079 * -0.012 -0.169 ***
Other chemical products -0.187 *** -0.166 *** -0.186 *** -0.018 *** 0.018
Petroleum and coal products -0.223 *** -0.070 -0.168 *** -0.045 *** 0.069
Plastic products -0.672 *** -0.257 *** -0.654 *** -0.015 *** 0.375 ***
Rubber products -0.173 *** -0.566 *** -0.200 ** -0.027 ** -0.344 *
Ceramics -0.422 *** -0.324 *** -0.421 *** -0.016 ** 0.097
Iron and steel  -0.211 *** -0.191 *** -0.207 *** -0.017 *** 0.013
Non-ferrous metals and products -0.639 *** -0.108 ** -0.611 *** 0.031 *** 0.488 ***
Fabricated metal products -0.555 *** -0.315 *** -0.543 *** -0.024 *** 0.218 **
Metal working machinery -0.395 *** -0.322 *** -0.402 *** -0.062 *** 0.091
Special industry machinery -0.419 *** -0.379 *** -0.412 *** -0.036 *** 0.029
Office, service industry and household machine -0.240 *** -0.310 *** -0.265 *** -0.021 ** -0.032
Miscellaneous machinery and machine part -0.476 *** -0.334 *** -0.471 *** 0.011 ** 0.132 ***
Industrial electric apparatu -0.369 *** -0.246 *** -0.358 *** -0.034 *** 0.112 **
Household electric appliance -0.340 *** -0.263 *** -0.347 *** 0.006 0.090
Communication equipment and related products -0.492 *** -0.301 *** -0.467 *** 0.028 *** 0.141
Electronic data processing machines and electronic equipmen -0.169 *** -0.230 *** -0.180 *** -0.001 -0.039
Electronic parts and devices -0.447 *** -0.256 *** -0.434 *** -0.026 ** 0.166
Miscellaneous electrical machinery and supplie -0.340 *** -0.309 *** -0.345 *** -0.055 *** 0.040
Motor vehicles -0.328 *** -0.215 *** -0.321 *** 0.015 *** 0.102 *
Miscellaneous transportation equipmen -0.353 *** -0.319 *** -0.337 *** 0.019 *** 0.018
Precision instruments -0.306 *** -0.293 *** -0.308 *** -0.042 *** 0.017
Other manufacturing -0.253 *** -0.060 -0.235 *** -0.025 ** 0.164
Notes: *P=.10, **P=.05, ***P=0.01
We estimated specification (4) of Table 4.4 for each industry in order to obtain the convergence coefficients.   







































Amount of materials purchased from abroad/total amount of materials purchased 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.028
Stock of direct investment abroad/total assets 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.007
Share of non-production workers in total workers 0.002 0.112 0.003 0.118 0.001 0.109
R&D intensity 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.008
Number of years passed since being established 0.000 1.517 0.000 2.009 0.000 0.868
ln(number of workers) 0.004 0.577 0.003 0.539 0.004 0.618
Total liability/total asset 0.002 -0.161 0.003 -0.167 0.001 -0.154
Foreign-ownership dummy (majority-owned by a single foreign firm) 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.017
Domestic-affiliate dummy (majority-owned by a single domestic firm) 0.002 0.138 0.001 0.102 0.002 0.173
Summation of all the above divergence effects 0.011 0.013 0.010
Convergence effect (the average difference of TFP level*the estimated coefficient value
of the beta convergence)
-0.091 0.300 -0.114 0.295 -0.072 0.305
Standard error of the random shock 0.0797 0.0828 0.0758
Notes: We used coefficients of specification (4) in Table 4.4.






















Lowest TFP group 34.0% 17.3% 10.3% 9.0% 7.2% 6.8% 4.1% 4.1% 3.3% 3.9%
2nd TFP level group 19.9% 18.8% 15.0% 12.8% 9.2% 7.3% 4.5% 5.1% 4.4% 3.0%
3rd TFP level group 12.7% 15.4% 14.9% 13.3% 11.4% 8.6% 9.5% 4.6% 5.5% 4.1%
4th TFP level group 9.3% 12.1% 14.1% 14.9% 13.2% 11.6% 9.3% 6.3% 5.1% 4.0%
5th TFP level group 5.8% 9.8% 12.7% 13.3% 14.1% 11.7% 12.0% 9.1% 7.0% 4.5%
6th TFP level group 4.2% 9.6% 10.2% 11.2% 11.7% 13.9% 13.1% 10.8% 8.6% 6.8%
7th TFP level group 3.7% 5.4% 9.0% 10.5% 10.3% 13.1% 14.3% 13.2% 11.8% 8.7%
8th TFP level group 3.9% 4.4% 4.9% 5.7% 9.1% 11.6% 14.5% 17.1% 17.3% 11.5%
9th TFP level group 3.3% 4.4% 5.1% 5.0% 7.9% 9.6% 10.4% 16.3% 18.6% 19.5%
Top TFP level group 2.4% 3.2% 3.6% 4.2% 6.2% 6.1% 7.9% 13.4% 18.2% 34.9%





















a b c=b/a a b c=b/a
1994 825336 86358 10.5% 2475820 120704 4.9%
(3396) (556) (3419) (375)
1995 759593 -3.3% 86344 11.4% 2734449 -0.9% 141268 5.2%
(3559) (536) (3582) (370)
1996 694034 -2.2% 86792 12.5% 2743078 -1.1% 151256 5.5%
(3519) (523) (3541) (382)
1997 728367 -0.8% 84792 11.6% 2620956 -0.6% 143750 5.5%
(3491) (533) (3515) (319)
1998 696177 -5.2% 68078 9.8% 2418887 -1.5% 182579 7.5%
(3479) (503) (3501) (348)
1999 679635 -3.0% 131938 19.4% 2381912 -1.5% 168144 7.1%
(3423) (768) (3448) (530)
2000 644740 -1.7% 69637 10.8% 2214509 0.4% 104466 4.7%
(3182) (469) (3206) (303)
2001 651308 -6.2% 2262099 -2.9%
(3329) (3354)
Average value  -3.2% 12.3% -1.1% 5.8%
Notes: The values in parentheses denote the number of firms.  
Table 4.8 Comparison of Firms' Employment Growth and Firm "Exits" between the Top Firm Group and the Bottom Firm Group: All
Manufacturing Firms
Below the 25 percentile in each industry
Number of workers
Above the 75 percentile in each industry
Number of workers